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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 China’s immense growth over the past three decades presents many paradoxes. 
China is now considered to be a global superpower, yet it still struggles to provide its 
citizens with clean water and food. Though the country is on its way to becoming the 
world’s largest producer of renewable energy, Beijing’s smoggy gray sky is a testament 
to China being one of the most polluted countries on the earth.1 As China’s largest city by 
population, Shanghai has grown into an international business hub boasting a modern 
skyline glittering with skyscrapers, while two-thirds of the population continue to reside 
in rural areas making less than $2,000 a year.2 Perhaps the greatest paradox of all in 
China is the coexistence of its old Communist state politics and new capitalist economy.  
 Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy in 1978 marked the beginning of China’s 
economic reform. By opening up to the outside world, the Chinese government intended 
to actively develop foreign economic cooperation and exchange.3 Foreign direct 
investment (FDI), or investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises outside of 
the economy of the investor, slowly started to flow into China starting from the 1980s.4 
In particular, venture capital and private equity, two forms of financial FDI, were 
introduced to China during this period. Previously, the government was the main source 
of capital for domestic enterprises, but a large portion of that capital went to China's 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which meant the private sector was experiencing a 
                                                
1 Christina Larson, “The Great Paradox of China: Green Energy and Black Skies,” Yale Environment 360, 
August 17, 2009, accessed April 27, 2014, 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_great_paradox_of_china_green_energy_and_black_skies/2180/.  
2 Edward Wong, “Survey in China Shows a Wide Gap in Income,” The New York Times, July 19, 2013.  
3 Ronald Coase and Ning Wang, How China Became Capitalist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
110. 
4 Harrison G. Blaine, Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008), vii. 
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shortage of financial capital. Venture capital and private equity filled in this financing 
gap. Unlike venture capital, which focuses more on companies in an early stage of 
development, private equity investment is directed at firms that have already matured in 
its development. Foreign private equity investment has taken longer to evolve in China 
because it requires a more sophisticated capital market, which took time for the Chinese 
government to establish. China is now the top destination for private equity investment in 
Asia as more than two-thirds of total Asian private equity investment currently flood into 
the country.5 
 Due to its relatively late start, private equity is considered a nascent industry in 
China with many opportunities and challenges. Large global private equity firms began 
their China operations beginning in the late 1990s with hopes of making impressively 
high returns. In the past two decades, there have been many examples of successful as 
well as failed foreign private equity deals in China. Interestingly, the Chinese government 
has shown instances of supporting foreign investment in industries deemed sensitive, 
while blocking investment in less sensitive sectors, which is usually not the case. This 
thesis aims to illuminate the reasons behind this anomaly. It investigates the 
considerations of Chinese regulators when reviewing foreign private equity proposals 
through an analysis of four main case studies in order to reveal a facet of China's 
evolving market economy. Given the regulatory, political, and cultural challenges in 
China's current private equity environment, this paper proposes that the future of China's 
private equity market may not be as promising as anticipated by foreign investors.  
                                                
5 "Asia's Favorite Money Pit?" AVCJ Private Equity and Venture Capital Report CHINA (Inclusive Media 
Investments Limited, 2012).  
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 Beginning with an overview of private equity, Chapter 1 builds a fundamental 
basis for the case studies by laying out the definition, process, and trends along with a 
literature review of private equity investment pertaining to emerging markets. Chapter 2 
illustrates how China's private equity industry has developed since the mid-1980s, 
dividing it into three phases, especially focusing on the evolution of regulations relevant 
to private equity. Chapters 4 and 5 present case studies of successful and failed attempts 
of foreign private equity firms to invest in Chinese companies. The cases will focus on 
deals made by foreign private equity firms, particularly U.S. private equity firms, because 
these deals offer a more objective view of the reasoning behind Chinese regulators. The 
Chinese government generally favors domestic private equity firms because of its desires 
to expand China's own private equity industry.  
The case studies will first offer a brief background of the two companies involved 
in the deal along with their reasons for wanting a successful transaction, then draw out 
the whole process of the agreement as well as reasons for success or failure, and conclude 
with the idiosyncrasies of the deal. Case Study I, the successful deal between Newbridge 
and Shenzhen Development Bank, was chosen because it was the first time a foreign 
private equity firm took control of a state-owned bank. Case Study II, Blackstone's 
acquisition of BlueStar, was selected because it was the largest foreign investment in a 
Chinese firm in a non-initial public offering (IPO) context and the first time a private 
equity fund bought into a SOE without a planned exit. Case Study III, Carlyle's failed 
takeover of Xugong, concerns the biggest planned acquisition by a foreign investor of a 
controlling stake in a leading SOE that was blocked by the Chinese government. Case 
Study IV, the collapse of Coke's plan to acquire Huiyuan, was the largest bid to date for 
 4 
foreign control of a Chinese firm and the first time China's 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law 
(AML) was put to test. Although M&A transactions are considered to be different from 
private equity deals, the Coke-Huiyuan case was chosen due to the similar functionalities 
of the acquisition when compared with a private equity investment. Each case reveals 
significant aspects about China's evolving private equity industry. Chapter 6 draws out 
the parallels from the case studies and Chapter 7 concludes this paper with the glimpse 




Chapter 2: Overview of Private Equity in Emerging Markets 
 
 A comprehensive analysis of the success and failure cases in China’s private 
equity market requires a basic understanding of the field. In the past, private equity was 
more centered in developed markets like the U.S. and Europe. However, due to the bright 
prospects of emerging markets, studies on private equity in developing markets have 
continued to blossom. An overview of private equity’s definition, process, and trends 
along with a literature review on private equity in emerging markets will build a firm 
foundation for a better understanding of the private equity industry in China.  
 
1) Private Equity: Definition, Process, and Trends 
Definition of Private Equity 
 Private equity, in the simplest terms, can be defined as a type of asset owned by a 
private company that is not publicly listed on the stock exchange.6 There are typically 
three main elements of private equity: financing by an external investor, high risk with 
high return potential, and private negotiations between the parties.7 An external investor 
like a private equity firm would raise funds through pension funds, endowments, and 
high net worth individuals and use this to privately invest, or provide medium to long-
term finance, in return for an equity stake in an underperforming company that has a high 
potential for growth.8 Private equity investments were historically made in non-listed 
                                                
6 Harry Cendrowski, James P. Martin, and Louis W. Petro, Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations (Somerset, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).  
7 Cyril Demaria, Introduction to Private Equity (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley, 2010). 
8 A Guide to Private Equity, British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (BVCA), May 2004, 
Updated in October 2007, 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/Website%20files/2012_0001_guide_to_private_equity.pdf. 
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companies, but nowadays private equity funds make investments in publicly held 
companies as well.9 The basic idea of private equity is to privately invest in a company 
and make it more valuable over several years in order to sell it to a buyer who recognizes 
the lasting value that is added.10 This long-term value creation is achieved through active 
management, meaning that the investor becomes a minority or majority shareholder of 
the company and often sits on the board during the investment period. The investor 
provides not only financial investment but also human capital investment through 
managerial, operational, and technical expertise.11  
Based on the target company’s stage in development, private equity can also be 
divided into two categories: venture capital and buyout. The different stages of a 
company’s development include seed, start-up, expansion, and maturity.12 Venture 
capital refers to a subset of private equity that is generally associated with investments 
made in companies at a seed, start-up, or expansion stage in their development, while 
buyouts are capital provisions to more mature companies.13 Unlike the European 
definition of private equity, which considers venture capital and buyouts as a single asset 
class, the U.S. definition treats venture capital and buyouts as distinct asset classes.14 A 
more precise segmentation divides private equity into four different forms: venture 
                                                
9 Douglas Cumming, The Oxford Handbook of Private Equity (New York: Oxford UP, 2012). 
10 Ross Butler, The Little Book of Private Equity (Brussels: European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association), http://www.evca.eu/media/19732/Little-book-of-Private-Equity.pdf. 
11 Xieshu Wang, “A Survey Based Institutional Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and in 
Europe.” (PhD diss., University of Paris XIII Nord), 5.  
12Kwek Ping Yong, Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012).  
13 Claudia Sommer, Private Equity Investments: Drivers and Performance Implications of Investment 
Cycles (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2013). 
14 Ibid. 
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capital, growth capital, mezzanine capital, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs).15 Growth 
capital is a minority equity investment without control rights in a mature company that 
needs capital. Having both equity and debt characteristics, mezzanine capital is an 
investment in preferred stock or subordinated debt of a company.16 LBOs, typically 
targeting mature companies with strong operating cash flow, point to the purchase of a 
company using a large amount of debt along with some equity and involves strong 
managerial ownership.17 This paper will follow the U.S. definition of private equity 
referring to buyout investments and growth capital rather than venture capital because the 
case studies deal with established companies rather than start-up firms.  
 
Process of Private Equity 
 The process of private equity can be broken down into selecting, structuring, 
managing, and exiting.18 The pre-investment stage of selection involves planning, 
fundraising, and conducting due diligence.19 General partners (GPs), or managers of 
private equity funds, first draw out the strategy, type, and structure of the fund and then 
approach potential investors, namely limited partners (LPs), to raise the fund.20 The 
amount and pace of fundraising depends on factors like macroeconomic conditions and 
investors’ appetite for private equity. Afterwards, the GP narrows down the market and 
target in which it wishes to invest. This complex process is called due diligence, the 
investigation of a business’s performance identifying the merits, risks, feasibility, and 
                                                
15 Peter Cornelius, International Investments in Private Equity: Asset Allocation, Markets, and Industry 
Structure (Burlington, MA: Academic, 2011). 
16 David Stowell, An Introduction to Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity: The New 
Paradigm (Burlington, MA: Academic/Elsevier, 2010). 
17 Cumming, The Oxford Handbook of Private Equity. 
18 Sommer, Private Equity Investments.;  Yong, Private Equity in China.. 
19 Yong, Private Equity in China. 
20 Cendrowski, Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations.  
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viability of a deal.21 Investments in emerging markets tend to carry particular risks like 
currency fluctuations, political uncertainties, volatile capital markets, weak regulatory 
systems, and unreliable judicial systems.22 Private equity firms take on a more active role 
when choosing the desired target in developing countries because they rarely receive 
offers for potential targets like they do in the U.S.23  
After the selection process ends and a non-binding offer has been accepted by the 
target company, the private equity firm enters the structuring phase to determine the 
capital and legal framework of the deal. It chooses either to buy a pure equity stake, 
convertible bonds, or LBO and lays out terms for the degree of management control.24 
Once an investment closes, the private equity firm will begin to actively manage the 
portfolio company to enhance its operational and financial performance. Although 
holding a majority stake with strong management control may offer the private equity 
firm more freedom to implement large-scale restructuring and make big corporate 
decisions, a minority stake can also allow the private equity firm to add value with some 
degree of management control.25 Value can be created by improving managerial quality 
of staff, promoting corporate governance of board members, or maximizing capital 
efficiency of the firm.26 There are also intangible values like reputation, credibility and 
business networks that the private equity firm can offer to the portfolio company.27  
                                                
21 Lawrence Zhan Zhang, “The Legal Environment for Foreign Private Equity Firms in China”, Fordham 
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 16, no. 4 (2011): 839-89.; Yong, Private Equity in China. 
22 Zhang, "The Legal Environment for Foreign Private Equity Firms in China."  
23 Gonzalo Pacanins, “Private Equity in Developing Countries.” (MBA essay, Harvard Business School, 
1997), accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/develop.html. 
24 Yong, Private Equity in China, 18.  
25 Ibid, 22. 
26 Ibid, 23.  
27 Richard Daniel Ewing, “Private Equity in China: Risk for Reward,” The China Business Review 31, no. 4 
(July/August 2004): 48-51. 
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Finally, the private equity firm realizes its investment returns through a successful 
exit. After careful consideration of the timing and exit strategy, the portfolio company is 
harvested. The most common exit strategies are an IPO, private sale, or a trade sale.28 An 
IPO on a domestic exchange is regarded to be the most lucrative way of exiting a private 
equity investment because of the liquidity it generates.29 Private equity firms can easily 
sell their shares on the open market or directly distribute them to their LPs. It is also 
beneficial for the portfolio company because it can quickly raise large volumes of capital 
at a low cost.30 The second option is a private sale to a strategic buyer or financial 
investor, meaning the pre-existing investor commitments will be sold to another private 
equity fund. This exit strategy tends to have less return on investment than an IPO.31 The 
third option of a trade sale, also known as Mergers & Acquisition (M&A), has become an 
increasingly popular exit vehicle.32 This entails a sale of the company’s stock or assets to 
another entity for cash, stock, and/or debt. Trade buyers are often willing to a pay a 
premium to acquire a company with potential synergy effects. The downside to this 
option is that it may require regulatory approval, especially in countries with anti-
monopoly and antitrust laws, so it has the possibility of being rejected if regulators 
disapprove the buyer.33 Private equity firms must thoroughly examine this last process 
prior to its investment because it is arguably the most significant factor that determines a 
successful private equity investment. 
 
                                                
28 Cendrowski, Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations, 10.  
29 Andreas Woeller, “Private Equity Investment in the Brics”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and 
Financial Law 17, no. 4 (2012): 1307-61.  
30 Cendrowski, Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations, 70.  
31 Woeller, "Private Equity Investment in the BRICS." 
32 Cendrowski, Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations, 111.  
33 Yong, Private Equity in China, 27.  
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Trends of Private Equity 
With origins as early as the post-World War II period, private equity has seen 
tremendous growth throughout the years evolving into an institutionalized area for 
investment. Although the U.S. private equity industry has been in the lead for quite some 
time with Europe following right behind, emerging regions like the Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America have become a more attractive destination for private equity investments 
since the mid 1990s due to the saturation of the U.S. and European private equity 
markets.34  
An emerging, or developing, market economy is defined as an economy with low-
to-middle per capita income and usually refers to a country that works to catch up with 
developed economies.35 The rapid economic growth of these emerging markets seemed to 
promise more superior investment returns. Between 1992 and 1999, the emerging 
markets of Asia saw $50 billion of new capital flow in through 500 different private 
equity funds.36 In Latin America, the value of private equity capital grew 114% annually 
from $100 million to over $5 billion between 1992 and 1997.37 The high expectations of 
investors were unmet in the late 1990s with many severely underperforming funds. This 
was largely due to the shortcomings of emerging markets like low standards of corporate 
governance, weak legal systems, and dysfunctional capital markets.38 Exits took longer 
and returns on investment were lower than expected. However, once foreign investors 
                                                
34 Usmon Kuchimov, Asian Emerging Markets Private Equity – Challenging Multifold Risks (Rochester: 
Social Science Research Network, 2011).; Guy Fraser-Sampson, Private Equity as an Asset Class 
(Chichester, England: Wiley, 2007). 
35 Arindam Banerjee, “Private Equity in Developing Nations,” Journal of Asset Management 9, no. 2 
(2008): 158-70. 
36 Roger Leeds and Julie Sunderland, "Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets," Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 15, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 111-9. 
37 Ibid.   
38 Ibid.  
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learned how to develop a more tailored approach aligned with emerging market realities, 
they were able to see impressive gains. In the last decade, the average return on private 
equity in emerging markets surpassed that of the U.S.39 More than $36.5 billion worth of 
private equity investment went into emerging markets over the past ten years with China, 
India, and Brazil accounting for two-thirds of market activity.40 Even after the global 
downturn in 2008, many institutional investors believed that emerging markets will 
continue to present attractive investment opportunities.41 A 2012 survey conducted by the 
Emerging Market Private Equity Association (EMPEA) showed that more than two-
thirds of the 106 institutional investors who were surveyed expected their private equity 
funds in emerging markets to increase in the following years.42 This suggests a 
continuous upward trend for the private equity industry in emerging market economies.  
2) Literature on Private Equity in Emerging Markets 
 The academic study of private equity began in the late 1980s, gaining attention 
from researchers in fields like corporate finance, institutional economics, and managerial 
behavior.43 However, since private equity investments reached emerging markets only 
since the mid-1990s, the academic literature on private equity in emerging markets is 
relatively sparse. The World Bank produced some of the earliest literature. Lieberman et 
al. (1998) examined the links between privatization as a development policy and the fast 
                                                
39 Darek Klonowski, Private Equity in Emerging Markets : The New Frontiers of International Finance. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 56.  
40 CFO Innovation Asia Staff, “China, India and Brazil Account for Two Thirds of Private Equity 
Emerging Market Activity,” Questex Media, September 18, 2003, accessed April 26, 
2014, http://www.cfoinnovation.com/content/china-india-and-brazil-account-two-thirds-private-equity-
emerging-market-activity. 
41 "New Survey Shows IIs Still Favor Emerging Markets Private Equity," Private Equity Asia 5, no. 5 (May 
2009): 29. 
42 Prabha Natarajan, "Private Equity to Hike Emerging-Market Allocations," LBO Wire, April 13, 2012. 
43 Wang, “Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and Europe,” 7. 
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growth of equity markets in emerging markets.44 Although the book focused on the 
broader equity market, a section about the evolution of emerging market equity funds 
explains the role of venture capital and private equity funds in privatization and emerging 
equity markets. Private equity rapidly expands its presence in academic literature in the 
2000s. Researchers illustrated the potential of private equity in emerging markets like 
Asia (Cumming, 2010; Robertson, 2010), India (Kulkami and Prusty, 2007; Dossani, 
2012; Chakrabarti, 2013), Russia (Musatova, 2009), and Latin America (Rozeira and 
Roberto, 2005; Charvel, 2009). 
 Among the emerging markets, China is the most studied country regarding private 
equity mainly because of the scope of interest among foreign investors towards China.45 
China's institutional environment greatly differs from the West (Peng and Heath, 1996), 
with beginnings as a planned economy. This brought scholars to explore how private 
equity, a Western method of financing, fit into China's distinct economic system . 
Literature on China's private equity has been produced by academics (Feng, 2004; 
Bethune, 2006; Jingu and Kamiyama, 2008), consulting firms (Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
Bain & Company), and professional associations (BVCA, EVCA, AVCJ, ChinaVenture, 
Zero2IPO, China First Capital).  Though there has been a considerable increase in the 
volume of academic literature on China's private equity market, there are still many 
unexplored areas worth analyzing, which leaves room for more development.  
                                                
44 Ira W. Liberman and Christopher D. Kirkness, Privatization and Emerging Equity Markets (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Publications, 1998). 
45 Wang, “Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and Europe,” 8. 
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Chapter 3: Development of Private Equity in China 
1) Introductory Phase: Mid-1980s to Mid-1990s 
Private equity was an unfamiliar concept in the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s 
1978 economic reform.46 The introduction of private equity was prompted by the 
government’s desire to boost the development of science and technology, an industry that 
had lacked operational efficiency and innovation under China’s planned economy.47 The 
first venture capital fund was established in 1985 by the central government when the 
State Science and Technology Commission and the Ministry of Finance joined together 
to create China New Technology Venture Investment Corporation.48 Local governments 
followed suit and established their own venture capital funds. They believed successful 
technology-based ventures would propel the development of the regional and national 
economy. Therefore, venture capital funds primarily focused on stimulating scientific and 
technological advancement rather than earning high returns.49  
Venture capital had not yet established a foothold in the 1980s, but this slowly 
began to change in the early 1990s. The government’s concentration on science and 
technology shifted to the capital market. In response to an increased demand for 
corporate financing, the government created the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 1990 and 1991, respectively.50 At the end of 1992, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established under the State Council as a 
                                                
46 Yong, Private Equity in China, 79.  
47 Wang, “Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and Europe,” 8.  
48 Steven White, Jian Gao, and Wei Zhang, "Financing New Ventures in China: System Antecedents and 
Institutionalization,"Research Policy 34, no. 6 (August 2005): 894-913. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Martha Avery, Min Zhu, and Jinqing Cai, China’s Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Global 
Impact (Singapore: John Wily & Sons, 2009). 
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ministry-level unit in charge of regulating China’s securities and futures markets. It 
promulgated the Company Law in 1994 to reorganize SOEs into corporate entities. This 
not only centralized and consolidated the capital market, but also lured foreign investors 
into China.51 Despite the government’s effort to lay a rudimentary institutional and 
supervisory framework for the nation’s financial capital market, there was a very small 
number of foreign private equity and venture capital firms in China during this phase. 
Foreign investors were still dubious of the investment returns considering the immature 
legal and regulatory environment in China.52 As a result, the government boosted efforts 
to address these issues.  
2) Development Phase: Mid-1990s to Early 2000s 
The growth of China’s private equity market picked up its pace in the late 1990s. 
Under the approval of the State Council, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
promulgated the Administrative Measures on the Establishment of Chinese Industrial 
Investment Funds Abroad in 1995, the first nationwide regulation on private equity.53 It 
allowed domestic non-banking financial and non-financial institutions to co-fund with an 
overseas investment institution to invest in China’s industrial development projects.54 In 
1996, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the Law Promoting the 
Industrialization of China’s Technological Achievements, the first legal statement 
allowing venture capital as a commercial activity and enterprises to raise funds that 
                                                
51 Michael Tan, Corporate Governance and Banking in China (New York: Routledge, 2013), 33.  
52 Yong, Private Equity in China, 79.  
53 Wang Bo, “Risk Prevention Measures for Private Equity in China” (paper presented at the International 
Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government, Jiangxi, October 17-19, 2008).  
54 Wang, “Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and Europe,” 9.  
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support technology ventures.55 The main statute regulating investment banks, the 
Securities Law, was born in 1998 to separate deposit-taking and investment bank 
activities.56 Several figures, including Prime Minister Li Peng and Vice Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji, pushed for greater expansion of China’s venture capital industry at the Ninth 
Conference of the NPC.57 As a result, the number of venture capital firms significantly 
increased.58 Government-led funds slowly gave way to private and foreign funds.59 
In addition to these efforts, the U.S. dot-com boom also accelerated the rise of 
China’s venture capital industry. During the peak of the Internet boom in 1997 and 1998, 
many new Internet portals in China were in need of funds to expand their businesses. 
China’s Internet industry grew rapidly, mainly due to the younger Chinese generation’s 
high demand, and this attracted many foreign venture capital firms.60 The stricter criteria 
for listing on China’s domestic exchanges led Chinese IT firms to list on the NASDAQ 
instead. Institutional investors preferred to accumulate equity holdings in these overseas 
listed vehicles.61 Foreign venture capital funds flowed into China’s top Internet portals 
like Alibaba, Sina, and Sohu. Unfortunately, the boom came to an end when the Internet 
bubble popped in 2000. Many venture capital firms that invested in China suffered from 
severe losses and consequently, China’s private equity sector shrank in 2001 to 2003.62  
                                                
55 Anthony Bartzokas and Sunil Mani, Financial Systems, Corporate Investment in Innovation, and Venture 
Capital (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), 164-165.  
56 David Stowell, Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity (Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 
2013), 43. 
57 Bartzokas and Mani, Financial Systems, Corporate Investment in Innovation, and Venture Capital, 165-
166. 
58 Yong, Private Equity in China, 79. 
59 Wang, “Comparative Study of Private Equity in China and Europe,” 10.  
60 Yong, Private Equity in China, 80.  
61 Duncan Clark, “Private Equity and Pragmatism in China,” Far Eastern Economic Review 171, no. 9 
(November 2008): 39. 
62 Takeshi Jingu and Tetsuya Kamiyama, “China’s Private Equity Market”, Nomura Capital Market 
Review 3, no. 3 (2008): 26.  
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3) Accelerated Growth Phase: Mid-2000s to 2010  
 China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 was partly 
based on the government’s pledge to implement significant changes in the nation’s 
financial system.63 Major U.S. private equity firms like Carlyle, TPG, and Warburg 
Pincus entered the Chinese market during this time when the regulatory regime was 
underdeveloped. There were several important regulations relevant to private equity that 
attempted to address this problem.  
In 2006, the Company Law and Securities Law were revised to match the 
standards of developed economies. The new Company Law strengthened managerial 
accountability, minority shareholder rights, and corporate governance.64 It also specified 
that direct foreign investments in China can be carried out through a wholly foreign 
owned enterprise, a contractual joint venture, or an equity joint venture.65 Adopted at the 
same NPC session as the new Company Law, the revised Securities Law laid the 
groundwork for the development of financial derivatives and multi-level securities 
markets. Investors were given more protection when issuing or trading securities and 
Chinese regulators were granted more power to fulfill their responsibilities.66  
As the number of Chinese enterprises acquired by foreign purchasers began to 
grow substantially, the government saw the need for a stronger regulatory structure 
focusing on foreign-funded M&A.67 On August 8, 2006, six government agencies68 
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jointly issued the 2006 M&A Rules69 that replaced the 2003 Interim Provisions on 
Mergers and Acquisition of Chinese Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. The new 
regulation showed some improvements by allowing Chinese enterprises to be acquired in 
exchange for equities held by foreign investors when previously, shares could only be 
bought with cash.70 It also enhanced corporate transparency and the prevention of illegal 
practices like “round-tripping.”71 Despite these improvements, many foreign investors 
worried of increased protectionism because it created an additional screening process for 
cross-border M&A deals.72 Foreign investors were now required to notify the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) of a proposed M&A that results in gaining control of a Chinese 
firm involved in a “key domestic industry, national economic security, or famous 
national.”73 These broad and vague terms implied great uncertainty. Moreover, 
MOFCOM's power was reinforced as it was given ultimate approval authority over M&A 
transactions, which meant that foreign investments would be subject to more stringent 
government review.74 Each of the six government agencies that joined to issue the M&A 
Rules was given specific roles and responsibilities related to the whole review process. 
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Coordination among these entities would become crucial for efficient regulatory 
practices.  
 Another significant regulation was the Anti-Monopoly Law that took effect in 
August 2008. After nearly 14 years of debate, the AML was adopted by the NPC as the 
first comprehensive antitrust legislation in China.75 It prohibited monopoly agreements, 
the abuse of a dominant position, and M&A that restricts market competition.76 Although 
this signified China’s march toward a market economy, the failure to effectively enforce 
the law in several instances revealed the weaknesses of the regulation.77 Overseas 
investors also raised the question of the law being used as a pretense for trade 
protectionism as we will see in the case study of Coca Cola and Huiyuan. Other laws like 
the Partnership Enterprise Law, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Foreign Exchange 
Regulation, and Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue also contributed to 
the development of China’s regulatory framework for its private equity market.  
 Along with this legal groundwork for foreign private equity investment, there 
were signs of the burgeoning domestic private equity industry. The first mainland RMB-
denominated industry investment fund, Bohai Industrial Investment Fund, was created 
after gaining approval from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
an agency under the State council focusing on macroeconomic management, in 
December 2006.78 Since then, many other domestic private equity funds ranging from 
RMB6 billion to RMB20 billion have been raised to finance small businesses in the 
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specific industries like manufacturing, energy, or high-technology.79 Unlike foreign 
private equity funds, domestic funds are not subject to regulatory opposition or delays, 
giving them a significant advantage over foreign investors.80 The 2008 global financial 
crisis slowed down fundraising, investment, and exit activities of foreign financial 
institutions. Nevertheless, Chinese domestic funds steadily grew. In 2008, China’s private 
equity industry had 51 new funds worth $61 billion, 71.9% higher than the previous year, 
which were constituted of 30 foreign funds and 20 domestic funds.81 With the growing 
number of RMB funds, many foreign private equity firms have started to put more 
emphasis on setting up funds geared toward local investors. Although there are still many 
insufficiencies and challenges in China's private equity market, numerous private equity 
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Chapter 4: Successful Foreign Private Equity Investments in China 
1) Case Study I: Newbridge Capital and Shenzhen Development Bank  
Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB) was established in 1987 as a regional state-
owned commercial bank based in Guangdong. SDB’s transformation from a failing bank 
drowning in bad loans to a healthy lending institution has made it an icon of China’s 
evolving capital market. It was the first bank to announce its IPO in May 1987 and got 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 1991, which meant that it would no 
longer be a privately held company.82 Shenzhen, a southern coastal city bordering Hong 
Kong, proved to be a prime location for SDB because of the city's exceptional growth 
accomplished through the central government’s support for special economic zones 
(SEZ). After obtaining a nationwide banking license, SDB expanded to 225 branches 
throughout China by 2002.83 At the end of 2002, 72.4% of SDB’s shares outstanding 
were held by the public and 27.6% were held by Shenzhen government controlled 
entities.84 This meant that local entities owned most of SDB's non-tradable shares, but 
were also the bank’s own borrowers.85 This can result in biased lending practices, which 
greatly increases the likelihood of lending to risky borrowers. Moreover, SDB’s non-
performing loans (NPL), or loans that have a high probability of default, to gross loans 
ratio was 11.6%, which was 4.3% higher than the average of other joint stock banks at 
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the time.86 Despite the bank’s accumulation of low quality loans along with its 
shareholders who were reluctant to hand over their lending decisions, SDB's extensive 
national network in China’s prosperous regions caught Newbridge Capital's attention. 
         Founded by Texas Pacific Group’s (TPG) David Bonderman and Blum Capital 
Partners’ Richard Blum in 1994, Newbridge Capital was among the first U.S.-based 
private equity firms focusing on investment in Asia. It is now a part of TPG Capital, 
which currently boasts of raising the largest Asia-focused fund since the global economic 
crisis.87 Due to the Chinese government’s unwillingness to allow standard control-type 
buyout deals, especially for SOEs, Newbridge slowly penetrated China’s market through 
minority stake investments in more traditional industries like food and beverage in the 
mid-1990s.88  
In 1999, Newbridge bought a 51% stake in Korea First Bank for $417 million 
becoming the first foreign owner of a South Korean bank.89 By redesigning the bank’s 
branch network, centralizing its credit-approval system, and revamping its operational 
practices, Newbridge was able to transform Korea First Bank (KFB) from a bankrupt 
creditor to South Korea’s most trusted lender.90 Six years later, KFB was bought by 
Standard Chartered for $3.25 billion, a nearly four-fold return. This valuable experience 
proved to be a harbinger of the success that Newbridge would achieve with SDB.  
Behind the KFB success story stood Weijian Shan, an experienced Chinese 
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negotiator who joined Newbridge in 1998 as the managing director for Asian 
operations.91 After persevering through China’s Cultural Revolution in the Gobi desert as 
a young man, Shan moved to America, where he studied business and rose to prominence 
in the private equity industry.92 Continuing with the success that he saw in South Korea, 
Shan led the first foreign acquisition of a stake in SDB beginning in 2002 despite his 
reluctance to work on deals with Chinese firms because of the lack of respect for private 
property rights that would create formidable obstacles for foreign investors.93  
Despite such skepticism, Shan began a tumultuous journey that began with 
optimistic negotiations, stalled with SBD’s renouncement and Newbridge’s counteractive 
indictment, but ended with a fruitful acquisition of SDB. Private equity was still an 
unfamiliar concept in China when preliminary negotiations between SDB and Newbridge 
took place. The highly regulated banking industry, in particular, was an untapped market 
for foreign private equity investment. Previously, most of the completed deals had been 
minority-stake investments, not large scale control-buyouts.94 Shan saw great potential in 
this market and used his network of senior officials in mainland China to gain support for 
this project. The Shenzhen government worried that SDB’s declining performance would 
negatively affect the local economy because many export-oriented manufacturing firms 
relied on SDB’s financing. This made it easier for Shan to persuade the municipal 
government that Newbridge’s notable management and operational expertise would help 
SDB get out of its period of fragility. Along with Shan’s impressive track record in Korea 
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and wide connections in China, Newbridge posed no competitive threat to SDB, which 
greatly appealed to Shenzhen government officials.  
Backed by the government, Shan and his team started a due diligence process in 
May 2002 to determine a comprehensive turnaround strategy for the bank.95 They sought 
to do this primarily through tight management control of SDB. Board control rights 
would be especially important because this would allow the firm to address problems of 
poor governance, management, and credit control culture.96 Newbridge was able to reach 
an agreement with SDB in June 2002 with endorsement from Beijing regulators and the 
State Council.97 The binding contract gave Newbridge a 17.89% stake of non-tradable 
shares in SDB, slightly below the China Banking Regulatory Commission's (CBRC) 20% 
limit for individual foreign holdings in Chinese banks.98 With 72.4% of shares in public 
hands, SDB was relatively dispersed compared to other joint-stock banks, allowing 
Newbridge to gain sizable control with a small stake by securing the right to appoint 8 
out of 15 board members.99 In order to alleviate the government’s worries about the risks 
of a short-term investment, Newbridge promised to not to sell its stake for at least five 
years.100 SDB was bought at roughly 1.6 times the book value when market shares were 
trading at 4.5 times because the NPL ratio was estimated to be much higher than the 
reported number.101 In many aspects, this was a win-win situation. Newbridge would be 
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able to hold a majority stake in SDB with management control at a profitable price and 
SDB would be able to use foreign expertise to get back in shape. The deal received wide 
domestic and foreign media coverage once a public announcement was made in 
September 2002 about the final stage of consultations. It was seen as a dramatic turning 
point in China’s restrictive banking sector. Fred Hu, a managing director of Goldman 
Sachs in Hong Kong at the time, described this as a “pioneering deal in which the 
authorities ceded real control” and a “new commercial model in China.”102  
Despite this positive outlook, SDB reneged on its agreement with Newbridge in 
May 2003. On May 21, SDB abruptly dissolved the transitional management committee 
set up by Newbridge earlier in September, which led Newbridge to immediately take 
legal action. Many speculated about the reasons behind SDB’s renouncement. Some 
proposed that the great discontent of SDB’s existing board members, which comprised of 
Shenzhen government officers and senior executives from local SOEs, played a large role 
in the public fallout.103 There was great tension between the transitional management 
team and the existing board members because the Shenzhen officials on the board were 
more concerned about their own job security than SDB’s possible boost in performance 
with Newbridge’s assistance.104 The opponents of the deal criticized Newbridge, pointing 
to the discounted price at which the firm announced would buy SBD. Newbridge was 
depicted as a “greedy” foreign investor that greatly undervalued the bank.105 The furtive 
search for an alternative investor began. While foreign private equity firms like The 
Carlyle Group and Morgan Stanley were unwilling to take on the challenge, Chinatrust 
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Commercial Bank (CTBC) seemed eager about this rare opportunity and emerged as a 
potential investor willing to pay more than Newbridge.106 CTBC, Taiwan’s leading 
privately-owned bank, is controlled by a powerful business clan that has accumulated 
great wealth for four generations, namely the Koo family.107  The Koos openly expressed 
their desire to invest in a mainland bank in the past, but were restrained by financial 
regulations in Taiwan and China.108 A deal with SDBD would certainly help them build 
tight business relations and expand their presence on the mainland.  
Another speculation was Newbridge’s loss of support due to changes in the State 
Council, Central Bank, and securities agency. Zhu Rongji, China’s premier at the time, 
was a main supporter of the deal with Newbridge. In March 2003, Zhu retired, the 
Cabinet was reshuffled, and top officials at China’s central bank and securities agency 
were also replaced.109 This signified great uncertainty for Newbridge because key backers 
of the deal were no longer there to solidify the agreement.110 The tide shifted in the favor 
of those who had opposed Newbridge’s acquisition, eventually leading to the fallout. 
The sudden announcement issued by SDB triggered an unpleasant legal dispute. 
Lacking only an official signature from SDB on the contract, Newbridge urged the 
Shenzhen government to “honor its obligations under this binding international contract” 
in an official statement, pointing out that the Bank of China (BOC) and CSRC had 
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already approved this deal.111 SDB’s negotiator refuted this by saying it was a 
“commercial decision” made by the board, rather than a "political decision."112 Many 
foreign investors in China are cautious about going to the courts for fear of endangering 
future relations in such a guanxi-based business environment.113 Although Newbridge 
would have preferred to settle this dispute outside the courts due to such concerns, SDB’s 
unwillingness to work things out provoked Newbridge to take legal action.114 A few days 
after SDB’s announcement to terminate the management agreement, Newbridge filed a 
suit against Chinatrust Commercial Bank in a Texas court, accusing Chinatrust of 
“flagrant unjustified interference” with Newbridge’s “contractual rights.”115 It also 
charged Chinatrust of conspiring with SDB’s president Zhou Lin, who was later arrested 
for granting allegedly illegal loans in 2006, to undermine their deal.116 The battle did not 
stop there as Newbridge went on and launched arbitration proceedings with the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in October, demanding financial 
compensation from the four major shareholders of SDB for the alleged breach of 
agreement.  
Not until April 2004 did the dispute come to an end. In an announcement issued 
through the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, SDB declared that it, Newbridge, and the four 
shareholders had concurred to withdraw all arbitration petitions and cross-petitions 
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without offering a clear reason.117 Some contend that the damage on the Chinese side 
would have been more severe than on Newbridge if this deal had ultimately failed. While 
Newbridge might only have lost a profitable opportunity, Shenzhen could have lost its 
reputation as a center for leading financial reform and undermined the central 
government’s effort to revamp China’s troubled banking sector.118 It was even said that 
the CSRS looked upon the aborted deal with scrutiny and criticized SDB for “insufficient 
information disclosure” during its negotiations with Newbridge and for failure to obtain 
the shareholders’ approval for the transitional management team.119 This may imply the 
political pressure on SDB to "seal the deal." Regardless of SDB's motivations, the 
termination of arbitration proceedings suggests that both parties preferred to settle the 
original deal rather than continue with this legal feud.  
Newbridge finally succeeded in officially buying a controlling stake in SDB 
becoming the first foreign investor to gain control of a Chinese bank at the end of May 
2004. SDB publicly announced that the board of directors had sold a 17.89% stake to 
Newbridge for $150 million.120 The board also approved the appointment of several 
executives from Newbridge, making non-Chinese nationals compose half of the 15-
member board. John Langlois, a Morgan Stanley executive in China, and Jeffrey 
Williams, the former CEO of Standard Chartered Bank in Taiwan, replaced SDB’s 
chairman Zhou Lin and president He Ru, respectively.121 Frank Newman, a former U.S. 
deputy treasury secretary, became SDB’s chairman and CEO after Langlois resigned a 
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year later. This was the first time non-Chinese businessmen were given such senior 
positions at a Chinese bank, which reflects SDB’s serious commitment to reforms.122 
Although the new management faced formidable challenges including a high NPL ratio 
and low capital adequacy ratio (CAR), they were able to overcome this through an 
effective, centralized, and accountable leadership structure.123 TPG, which subsumed 
Newbridge in 2006, was able to strengthen the bank’s branch network, cultivate a credit 
culture, and improve its balance sheet overall.124 Over the five years under TPG’s control, 
SDB’s net profit grew from $25.8 million in 2004 to $736.9 million in 2009, its NPL 
ratio dropped down from 11.41%  to 0.68%, and its CAR went up from 2.3% to 8.88%.125  
TPG’s success in enhancing SDB’s financial performance enabled the firm to exit 
its investment with a highly lucrative stake sale. In June 2009, China’s leading insurer 
Ping An Insurance Group announced its plans to buy a 16.7% stake from TPG along with 
new shares issued by SDB, which would give Ping An a 30% stake in the bank.126 It 
gained the approval from the CSRC, CBRC, CIRC, and MOFCOM despite opposition 
from the nationalist camp, which does not want any foreigner to profit TPG had the 
choice of either accepting a cash amount of $1.68 billion, five times the initial investment 
of $150 million, or a 4% stake of 299 million shares in Ping An. TPG chose the latter 
most likely because a share-swap option would be more favorable in the eyes of Chinese 
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officials since TPG would continue to retain a large stake in the financial sector.127 This 
turned out to be a wise decision because TPG was able to sell all of its stake in Ping An 
for a total of $2.41 billion in 2010, which was 16 times its original investment.128  
TPG is one of the few U.S. private equity firms to have made such a lucrative exit 
such as this. The major obstacle that TPG faced was resistance from the current board of 
local government officials who did not want to relinquish their control over the firm, 
rather than disapproval from Chinese regulators. Surprisingly, regulating agencies were 
actually supportive of the deal. This may have been due to the government's bigger 
agenda of the banking system reform. After the CCP Central Committee and the State 
Council held the First National Work Conference in November 1997, there were a series 
of policy reforms for state-owned commercial banks like SDB, which had been 
accumulating large volumes of NPLs due to biased lending practices, as mentioned above. 
The abolishment of the credit plan system, which forced state-owned commercial banks 
to lend according to government policies, in 1998 was the first step toward voluntary 
management of the bank's fund allocation.129 There were also capital injections by the 
government in an effort to salvage the balance sheet of failing banks. TPG came into the 
scene under these circumstances. With the help of a strong foreign private equity firm 
with a previous track record of salvaging a failing Korean bank, the government could 
remove some of its burdens. Furthermore, the alternative of allowing SDB to partner with 
a Taiwanese bank was not a politically plausible option. With this case study, we see that 
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Chinese regulators may allow foreign firms into sensitive industries like the banking 
sector if there is a bigger agenda at hand. TPG's success in turning SDB into a healthy 
bank could encourage the government to continue opening up its overly protected 
business areas in the future.  
 
2) Case Study II: The Blackstone Group and China National BlueStar Corporation 
 China National BlueStar Co., Ltd., China’s major manufacturer of new chemical 
products and specialty chemicals, was founded by Ren Jianxin in 1984. The Beijing-
based firm was brought under the control of the central government in April 2000. The 
next month, China’s State Council authorized the creation of China National Chemical 
Corp. (ChemChina), a large-scale enterprise administrated by SASAC, to restructure the 
country’s fragmented chemical industry.130 BlueStar became a special subsidiary of 
ChemChina, which is currently China’s largest chemical company and 19th largest in the 
world. With 24 state-level research institutes, two national laboratories, and over 40 
technical research centers, ChemChina spends tremendous resources on its R&D and 
even completed 95 key construction projects between 2006 and 2010.131 Chairman Ren 
Jianxin strongly believed that innovation, an essential factor for the firm’s future success, 
could be achieved through internationalization.132 Therefore, BlueStar has continued to 
put an emphasis on overseas development. In 2006, the company completed the purchase 
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of Adisseo Group, a leading French animal nutrition feed firm, by acquiring its parent 
company Drakkar Holdings S.A.133 Realizing the challenges of cross-cultural M&A, Ren 
welcomed the prospect of private equity when Blackstone extended the offer in 2007.134 
 A leading global alternative investment manager, the Blackstone Group L.P. 
began its Asian operations in 2005, focusing on private equity and real estate. After two 
years, the firm opened a private equity office in Hong Kong, marking its operational 
expansion to Greater China. Although this was a relatively late start compared to those of 
other U.S. private equity firms like Carlyle and TPG, Blackstone still managed to quickly 
magnify its presence in the mainland. Its IPO in June 2007 drew in a $3 billion 
investment from China Investment Company (CIC), a large sovereign wealth fund.135 
The following month, it played a key advisory role in government-owned China 
Development Bank’s (CDB) $13.5 billion investment in U.K. bank Barclays PLC, the 
largest foreign investment made by a Chinese company at that time.136 The company 
became a “rising star” in China, especially after developing links with the Chinese 
government, according to an analyst at China International Capital.137 After reviewing 
potential investment projects, Blackstone began discussing a possible investment in 
BlueStar. Preliminary negotiations between Blackstone and BlueStar began in mid-2007, 
a time when foreign private equity firms faced difficulty in buying stakes of state-backed 
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assets.138 Despite concerns of government opposition, Blackstone managed to sign a 
strategic alliance with ChemChina in September 2007 for a 20% stake in BlueStar, 
marking Blackstone’s first private equity investment in the mainland. It promised a 
considerable sum of $600 million during a time when most foreign private equity deals 
ranged from $50 million to $100 million in China.139 BlueStar completed its group 
restructuring and registered as a Sino-foreign joint stock limited company the following 
month.140  
 Blackstone’s expertise in the chemical industry was a major element to its 
success. Past private equity investments in chemical companies made Blackstone a 
credible and appropriate investor for BlueStar. In 2003, Blackstone had acquired the 
German chemical company Celanese AG and the U.S. chemical and water treatment firm 
Nalco.141 Ren trusted that this past experience with globally integrated producers of 
chemicals would help BlueStar advance its global strategy. Blackstone would not only 
provide an extra capital boost, enhance corporate governance, and improve management 
systems, but also accelerate international expansion through its global network.142 In an 
interview with McKinsey & Company, Ren noted that “if BlueStar tried to make overseas 
acquisitions in some parts of the world, it might cause unnecessary misunderstandings 
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and adversely affect the transaction, but with Blackstone’s participation, the path could 
be smoother,” implying that Blackstone would add to the credibility of BlueStar in future 
international transactions.143  
 Timing was another factor that worked to Blackstone’s advantage. During this 
period, SASAC was strongly pushing for the strengthening and expansion of mid-level 
SOEs because it ultimately desired domestic companies to become global players in their 
respective fields.144 Many small or mid-sized SOEs in various provinces were facing 
financial difficulty.145 Private equity funds could function as a way to carry out the 
government’s strategic reforms in these circumstances. However, the U.S. credit crunch 
of 2007 made it more difficult for private equity dealmakers to finance leveraged 
transactions.146 Therefore, Blackstone may have faced less competition, making it easier 
for the Chinese government to take notice of Blackstone.  
  The strongest driving force for Blackstone’s success could arguably be the 
extensive political connections of the deal’s orchestrator. Antony Leung joined 
Blackstone in 2007 to co-head the Hong Kong office with senior managing director Ben 
Jenkins. Born in Hong Kong, Leung received education from the University of Hong 
Kong and went on to work for Citigroup for 23 years. When Leung, known for being 
articulate and market-savvy, was Citi’s country corporate officer for China and Hong 
Kong, he was a compelling advocate for giving loans to political entities in Shanghai 
                                                
143 Ibid.  
144 Yong, Private Equity in China, 134.  
145 Koch and Ramsbottom, “A Growth Strategy for a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise,” 2.  
146 Sundeep Tucker, "Chemical Deal in China is a First for Blackstone," Financial Times, September 11, 
2007. 
 34 
when other Western banks were reluctant to do so.147 He climbed up the corporate ladder 
and eventually became the first locally born corporate head of Citi in Hong Kong around 
1992. He later joined Chase Manhattan Corporation, which eventually merged with J.P. 
Morgan, where he rose to the rank of Asia-Pacific chairman.148 In 1997, Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty was transferred from the U.K. to China. Leung took this opportunity to 
change the course of his career to politics and became a senior policy adviser under Hong 
Kong’s first postcolonial government.149 His service as the Financial Secretary of Hong 
Kong, beginning in 2001, came to an end after two years because his political career was 
harmed by a scandal when he bought a new luxury car just weeks before announcing an 
increase in vehicle registration fee.150 
However, it did not take long for Leung to make a comeback. After four years of 
keeping a low profile, he was offered a position as Blackstone’s first chairman for 
Greater China, which turned out to be a remarkably clever move for Blackstone. As a 
result of his experience in business as well as the government, Leung had developed 
longstanding relationships in China’s financial and political community. A Chinese 
official who had previously dealt with Leung notably said, “I respect [Leung] a lot. On 
one hand, he was a banker for many years — very experienced. On the other hand, he 
was an official in the Hong Kong government. I think he has business sense, broad 
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connections, and also he works very hard.”151 This sense of trust that Leung had built 
with Chinese politicians and bankers proved to be instrumental in opening the door to big 
deals. Using his connections, Leung scheduled a meeting with Lou Jiwei, the chief 
executive officer of CIC and the current Minister of Finance, in late April to pitch for a 
few of Blackstone’s shares. Much to Leung’s surprise, Lou and the managers of CIC 
expressed great interest in buying a major stake.152 There was little delay in the process 
because CIC signed the deal barely three weeks after Leung’s meeting with Lou. Leung 
also played a pivotal role in advising CDB’s investment in Barclays.153 Both instances 
greatly boosted Blackstone’s reputation and profile in China. There were conjectures that 
these established ties helped the subsequent BlueStar deal consummate.154 Leung’s wide 
network gave Blackstone a head start by skipping the auction process. A person familiar 
with the deal said in an interview with South China Morning Post, “The fact that 
Blackstone got to negotiate with a major player like BlueStar without having to go 
through an auction process that would have brought in a dozen funds and pushed up the 
price was impressive. That shows the depth of their political connections.”155 Leung was 
the main engineer behind these connections. Essentially, Blackstone was able to 
overcome the disadvantages as a latecomer in China’s private equity market by hiring the 
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right person.156 This is evidenced by the fact that guanxi is a significant component of a 
successful private equity investment in China.  
A combination of these three factors: field expertise, timing, and guanxi, 
generated the synergy needed to gain regulatory approval. Blackstone’s investment plan 
was officially given the green light on January 10, 2008 when the NDRC announced the 
government’s approval on its website.157 As a minority stake, Blackstone was limited to 
appointing two seats on BlueStar’s board of directors, which were taken by Leung and 
Jenkins. Even though it had minority control, Blackstone did not assume a passive role. It 
used its corporate partnership with ChemChina to bid for Nufarm, an Australian 
agricultural chemicals maker, in November 2007.158 This joint overseas acquisition was 
in alignment with BlueStar’s goals to expand internationally and Blackstone’s objective 
to boost returns.159 Despite the deal’s eventual failure, it demonstrated that there are still 
opportunities for minority investments in SOEs.  
Blackstone continued to evolve and gain competitiveness in China after the 
BlueStar deal. In August 2009, the firm announced its plans to establish an RMB fund, 
money raised by local investors. In an effort to develop the domestic private equity 
industry, the Chinese government had been discussing the regulatory framework for 
setting up local-currency funds since 2007.160 The ongoing debate among regulators over 
the rules did not deter Blackstone’s initiative. An RMB-denominated private equity fund 
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would allow Blackstone to make investments with more ease because it is characterized 
by faster regulatory approval, simpler registration processes, and more access to local 
deals.161 With hopes of raising Shanghai into an international financial center, the 
government of Pudong signed an agreement with Blackstone to form an RMB fund under 
the name of Blackstone Zhonghua Development Investment Fund with a target of 5 
billion yuan ($732 million).162 Some market watchers said that Blackstone’s relationship 
with the government had helped the firm four years down the line to obtain this 
approval.163 Blackstone set a precedent and paved the way for non-Chinese private equity 
investment based on local currency.164 
Blackstone has yet to make an exit from its stake in BlueStar. It has failed twice 
in a Hong Kong IPO of BlueStar Adisseo Nutrition Group, a unit of BlueStar, due to 
excessive market volatility.165 Nevertheless, Blackstone will continue its wide-ranging 
expansion in China. “China is a required course, not an elective, for any sensible global 
financial institution,” said Blackstone Chief Executive Stephen Schwarzman in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal.166 In other words, China’s importance in the 
foreign private equity industry will continue to grow and Blackstone plans to take the 
lead in this movement. 
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Chapter 5: Failed Foreign Private Equity Investments in China 
1) Case Study III: The Carlyle Group and Xugong Group Construction Machinery 
 Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group (XCMG) is one of China’s largest 
manufacturers of construction machinery and is based in the Jiangsu province. After its 
foundation in 1989, XCMG has grown to become China’s second biggest construction 
equipment maker and has gradually expanded its business worldwide by selling machines 
at a lower price than its foreign competitors.167 It is wholly owned by the government of 
Xuzhou, a critical part of the HuaiHai Economic zone, which boasts of vibrant machinery 
and mining industries. With advanced technology patents and technical innovation, 
XCMG aspires to become an internationally competitive firm ranking among the world’s 
top three in the industry.168 Xugong Group Construction Machinery Co., Ltd., which 
supplies more than half of the domestic market for hydraulic cranes and road-paving 
equipment, is one of XCMG's subsidiary companies.169 Due to growing competition in 
the construction machinery sector, the Xuzhou city government concluded that Xugong 
needed capital injections and restructuring in order to globally expand its national 
brand.170 Xugong began a rigorous auction process in 2004 that consisted of two rounds 
and six international bidders among which Carlyle Group surfaced as the front-runner for 
the control of Xugong.  
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 The Carlyle Group, a Washington, D.C.-based global asset management company 
specializing in private equity, has dominated foreign private equity investments in China 
since the early 2000s. It began as a boutique investment bank in 1987 founded by five 
partners with backgrounds in finance and politics. Some of its past directors include 
former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, former U.S. Secretary of Defence Frank 
Carlucci, and former U.K. Prime Minister John Major, which explains its reputation for 
having deep political connections in Washington.171 The 1998 establishment of Carlyle 
Asia Partners LP, an Asia-focused buyout fund amounting to $750 million, signaled its 
full-fledged effort to invest vigorously in Asian firms, particularly in the financial, 
consumer, and manufacturing services.172 It purchased a stake in a medium-sized Korean 
bank called KorAm Bank with JP Morgan in 2000 and in Pacific China Holdings, a 
Chinese department store chain, the following year.173 In 2004, Carlyle revealed its 
ambitious plans to invest as much as $1 billion in a wide variety of industries in China.174  
One of its aspired investment projects was the purchase of an 80% stake in 
Xugong Group for $300 to $400 million. This would have not only represented the first 
LBO in mainland China by a foreign private equity firm, but also an unprecedented 
concession of a state-owned firm’s majority stake to a foreign company.175 External and 
internal obstacles laid ahead of Carlyle. Externally, there was fierce competition against 
large firms like Caterpillar, AIG Global Investment Group, J.P. Morgan Partners LLC, 
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Warburg Pincus LLC, and Citigroup also wanting to strike a deal with Xugong. 
Internally, Carlyle faced a turnover among senior-level staff with Michael Kim, co-head 
of buyouts in Asia, leaving to start his own fund and taking several executives with 
him.176  
Despite such obstructions, Carlyle rose as the highest bidder after a long auction 
process and declared in October 2005 that it had signed a definitive agreement with 
Xugong Group to buy a 85% stake for $375 million, leaving 15% in the hands of XCMG. 
This price was roughly 1.7 times Xugong’s net asset value and roughly seven times its 
earnings.177 Unlike all the previous private equity investments by foreign firms in China, 
this deal would give a majority stake in the company. Both the Xuzhou government and 
Carlyle Group viewed this as a beneficial transaction. Xugong Group Chairman Wang 
Min said in a statement, “This is the right choice for a win-win outcome. It will unload 
our heavy historical burdens as an SOE, build an energetic and competitive system in the 
company, and help us build an international brand.”178 Through Carlyle’s injection of 
fresh new capital, Xugong planned to undergo a structural reform and widely expand its 
business. Xiang Dong Yang, the managing director and co-head of Carlyle Asia Partners, 
also expressed optimism saying, “We are excited about this important investment in 
Xugong, one of our largest in China. We look forward to working with the Xugong 
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management team to create a leading international construction equipment company.”179 
Gaining a majority stake in a large SOE like Xugong would assist Carlyle in obtaining 
future deals through more experience and name recognition with Chinese government 
officials.180  
Contrary to this bright outlook, Carlyle was unable to overcome the last hurdle of 
obtaining approval from the central government’s regulatory authorities. In particular, 
MOFCOM stood in the way of Carlyle’s acquisition. There were several supposed 
reasons for MOFCOM’s opposition to the buyout. Some thought of it as a retaliatory 
response to the U.S. government’s protectionist behavior.181 In 2005, there was a 
competition between Chevron Corporation and China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) to acquire U.S. oil producer Unocal Corporation. Although CNOOC’s opening 
bid was higher than Chevron’s initial bid, strong congressional opposition based on 
claims that CNOOC’s takeover could threaten national security and economic interests 
forced CNOOC to back down.182 MOFCOM used a similar argument to justify its 
disapproval of Carlyle’s buyout plans. Allowing foreign control over an important state 
asset like Xugong could endanger the country’s economic security, according to the 
ministry.183 Chinese government and industry officials also asserted that the possible 
exposure of Xugong’s advanced technology to foreign competitors could ultimately 
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threaten national security.184 However, construction machinery is generally not regarded 
as a sensitive sector.185 On the contrary, infrastructure, defense, banking, energy, and 
steel are several sensitive areas that have been traditionally linked to national interests 
meriting regulation.186 Xugong’s technology to make construction equipment may be 
linked to economic competitiveness and efficiency, but it is an overstatement to say that 
it is vital to China’s national security.187 Therefore, this can be seen as the government’s 
way of retribution rather than a genuine concern for security issues.  
Others suspected that the political hostility toward the deal was connected to 
nationalist sentiment spurred by Xugong’s rivals. After the deal was announced, the 
Chinese government was confronted with great pressure from competitors in the 
construction equipment manufacturing industry that feared Xugong would become too 
strong and competitive with Carlyle’s extensive network and capital injection.188 They 
worried that the acquisition could substantially hurt their interests. In order to assuage 
these concerns, MOFCOM declared that it would investigate assertions of Xugong 
creating a monopoly and hurting other construction machinery manufacturers. Carlyle 
was requested to submit an antitrust report along with a pledge not to create a monopoly, 
but this turned out to be insufficient for Xugong’s competitors.189 
One of Xugong's industry rivals, heavy machinery manufacturer Sany 
Corporation aggressively voiced its discontent in June 2006. Sany chief executive Xiang 
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Wenbo announced on his personal blog that it wanted to purchase Xugong at a 30% 
premium over Carlyle’s offer; however, he did not offer a detailed plan of how his 
company wanted to finance the bid. “What Sany is doing is for the country because 
manufacturing is a national strategic industry. The leading authority in a strategic 
industry equals national sovereignty. As a member of this industry, we do not wish to see 
national sovereignty damaged,” Xiang wrote in his blog post titled “XCMG Acquisition: 
A Beautiful Lie! (徐工并购：一个美丽的谎言！).190 In a provocative and sarcastic 
tone, Xiang laid out the reasons the deal should not go through. His usage of phrases like 
“selling anything it fine, but selling out the country is wrong” and “quxianjiguo (曲线救
国),” meaning saving the nation through twisted means, made it evident that Xiang 
wanted to stir up nationalist sentiment.191 There was doubt about Sany’s financial 
capability of actually acquiring Xugong considering its smaller size in terms of net sales 
and profit.192 Nevertheless, Xiang continued posting articles denouncing the Carlyle deal 
and succeeded in gaining widespread attention from the public and press. The domestic 
media began portraying the deal in a negative light calling the cheap purchase of an SOE 
by a foreign investor a form of corporate raiding.193 The government responded to this 
outcry in late June. In an attempt to assuage the upset public, the State Council issued an 
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edict that required key equipment manufacturers selling stakes to foreigners to first 
consult the central government and relevant departments.194  
Nevertheless, a growing protectionist wave swept throughout China, which 
eventually led to a three-day closed-door hearing in July 2006 that involved bureaucrats 
from MOFCOM and CSRC as well as shareholders, competitors, suppliers, and 
customers of Xugong to determine the legality of the Carlyle deal.195 This type of 
meeting was unprecedented in China. Besides Carlyle, which was excluded from the 
hearing, all parties with a perspective on the deal were able to have their say.196 Such an 
initiative indicates the increasingly cautious attitude of policymakers in Beijing when 
making decisions such as this because it requires them to address the more important 
question regarding market reform. Though the government did not publish the content of 
the hearing, some participants disclosed that there was an effort to set ground rules for the 
M&A of SOEs and leading Chinese companies.197 This effort was realized the following 
month when SASAC and MOF issued a circular about a new regulation stating that the 
“sale of state-owned assets should not violate the restrictive or prohibitive rules 
concerning the country’s economic safety.”198 Moreover, MOFCOM was given more 
legislative power with the Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
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Enterprises by Foreign Investors the same month, as explained in Chapter 3. Specifically, 
Article 12 of the provisions gave MOFCOM the authority to demand the termination of a 
transaction that could potentially have an impact on national economic security.199  
Seeing that there was great political pressure from economic hardliners to restrict 
foreign control of state assets, Carlyle promptly changed its proposal in September 2006. 
It reduced the size of its proposed stake from 85% to 50% at a price of $220 million, 
hoping that this would facilitate regulatory approval.200 Carlyle gave up its right to 
appoint the chairman of the board, but would still be able to appoint the vice-chairman 
and five of the ten board members.201 The Xuzhou city government, the provincial 
government of Jiangsu, and SASAC accepted the new joint-venture deal, but MOFCOM 
did not seem to budge.202 The central government also did not seem to show signs of 
support. The NDRC published its “Eleventh ‘Five-Year Plan’ on Utilizing Foreign 
Investment” in November 2006. One section emphasized the importance of reinforcing 
the supervision of M&A by foreign investors and ensured domestic control of key 
industries and enterprises that involve national security.203 This was in unison with 
MOFCOM’s provisions of M&A in June, which reveals the political unwillingness to 
change policy directions.  
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Seeing the stagnant status of regulatory approval, Carlyle made a final attempt to 
salvage the deal in March 2007. It decreased the size of its stake down to 45% for $184 
million.204 This did not seem to alleviate the government’s fear of selling a strategic 
company to a foreign investor. The contract between Xugong and Carlyle eventually 
expired the next year and Carlyle finally admitted its failure. In July 2008, Carlyle and 
Xugong released a joint statement saying that the agreement had lapsed and they would 
not longer proceed with the investment.205 A spokeswoman for Carlyle affirmed that the 
company was not discouraged by this defeat saying, “While we’re not proceeding with 
the investment, we value the strong partnership we have developed with Xugong. Carlyle 
has a long-term commitment to China and values the relationships it has developed with 
the various government agencies it has worked with through the years.”206 Even though 
the Xugong deal suffered numerous impediments, Carlyle continued to make investments 
in more than thirty companies deploying more than $1.3 billion between 2006 to 2008.207 
Carlyle’s China Pacific Insurance Group deal made $5.2 billion in returns from a $790 
million investment in 2012, making it not only Carlyle’s most profitable exit on an 
acquisition, but also the biggest in the industry.208 This illustrates how private equity 
firms can still succeed in making handsome profits if they are patient and fully aware of 
how to work in China’s opaque regulatory system. 
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2) Case Study IV: Coca Cola Company and China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd.  
 China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd., founded in 1992, is the country’s leading fruit 
and vegetable juice producer based in Beijing. This privately owned firm went public on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2007 and has increasingly gained popularity in China 
for its products, including 100% juices, nectars, and juice drinks.209 Operating more than 
30 factories across China and producing over 500 food and drink lines, Huiyuan has 
managed to expand its presence in the mainland and strengthen its national brand 
power.210 The company mission to “promote juice as part of a healthy diet for the good of 
consumers" implies its strategy of tapping into the growing health-conscious consumer 
base in China.211 According to the global marketing research firm AC Nielsen, Huiyuan's 
market share for pure juices was 43.8% in 2008. It also accounted for 42.4% of China’s 
market for nectars, or juice drinks with lower concentration. Considering that pure juice 
and nectars made up for 19.3% and 38.2%, respectively, of total revenue, Huiyuan is 
certainly a prominent leader in the high-end juice market.212 Although Huiyuan displayed 
great growth potential with a high market share, a closer look at its 2008 balance sheet 
showed signs of trouble. Huiyuan’s profit attributable to equity holders increased by 
7.2% to $53.8 million, but this was mainly derived from a $36.3 million rise in its 
convertible bonds value.213 Without this increase, the company would have had a 19% 
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decrease in profits. In addition, like many other mainland soft-drink producers, Huiyan 
struggled with rising costs and falling gross profit margins.214 Cost of sales went up by 
4.8% and gross profit dropped by 22.2%.215 Huiyuan wanted to grow bigger, but lacked 
the financial and management resources to do so.216 These factors explain why Huiyuan 
welcomed Coca Cola’s offer to acquire the firm in September 2008.  
 The world’s largest soft drinks manufacturer, Coca Cola Company was the first 
U.S. company to enter China after the nation opened up its economy in 1979. Since then, 
Coke has flourished into one of the biggest foreign drink brands in China’s rapidly 
expanding market. Coke was attracted to Huiyuan for several reasons. First, there has 
been a growing demand for healthy beverages in China. This can be attributed to the 
country’s rising middle class preferring healthier products due to an increase in health 
awareness.217 As more Chinese consumers turned toward Coke's non-carbonated drink 
products, the company’s growth in the carbonated drinks market slowed down.218 “Sales 
volume of fruit juices in China surpassed that of carbonated drinks for the first time in 
2007,” said Euromonitor International analyst Michelle Huang. “Especially in the last 
two years, Chinese consumers are increasingly choosing healthy drinks such as juice or 
tea.”219 Soft drinks analyst at Data Monitor, Michael Hughes also noted, “Though 
China’s fruit juice market is relatively small in the beverages space, it is a high-growth 
market that is expected to grow by more than 10% in the next few years as the middle 
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class becomes increasingly health-conscious.”220 Seeing this change in Chinese consumer 
preference, Coke pushed to expand its beverage portfolio beyond carbonated drinks in 
China. It had already tested this strategy in 2005 when it bought Multon, Russia’s second 
largest juice maker, and in 2007 with the acquisition of Glacau, maker of Vitaminwater, 
and Jugos del Valle SAB de C.V., a juice producer with a large presence in Mexico and 
Brazil.221 The firm sought to continue this global drive in China. “Huiyuan’s long-
established and successful juice brand would be highly complementary to Coca Cola’s 
China business,” said President of Coca Cola Muhtar Kent in an interview.”222  
 Second, an acquisition of Huiyuan would help Coke overcome the difficulties of 
operating in the Chinese market. Although China is the third largest market for Coke in 
terms of sales volume, margins are considerably thinner than margins in the U.S.223 
Distribution and marketing costs are high due to China’s fragmented retail market and 
state ownership of television advertising.224 Moreover, domestic competition limits 
Coke’s presence in certain regions in China. Lower-tier cities and rural areas have higher 
demands for more affordable drink brands and this is largely met by local companies.225 
Their main advantage over Coke is having local insights on tastes and preferences. 
Brands like Kangshifu, Wahaha, and Wang Lao Ji are popular among locals for their 
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ready-to-drink tea beverages.226 Coke’s acquisition plan was a response to all these 
challenges. The purchase of a popular local brand like Huiyuan would enable Coke to 
expand its distribution network and obtain product development expertise specifically 
based on Chinese consumer tastes.227  
 Last, Coke also desired to gain competitiveness against its international rival 
through this acquisition. A decade ago, Coke had made the big mistake of letting PepsiCo 
Inc. jump ahead and become the domestic leader in non-carbonated beverages like juice, 
flavored water, bottled water, sports drinks, and tea.228 Coke’s lack of innovation forced 
it to continue relying on carbonated drinks, which led to stagnant sales and slow 
growth.229 With Coke lagging behind, Pepsi’s share of the U.S. market for such drinks 
grew to almost double that of Coke’s.230 Nevertheless, Pepsi was still behind Coke in 
China’s non-carbonated drinks sector. In 2008, the firm announced that it would be 
boosting investment in new products and marketing in China by spending $1 billion more 
in the market over the next four years.231 Coke could not afford to let Pepsi surpass its 
global operations in China. Through the Huiyuan acquisition, Coke sought to outrun its 
competitor and ultimately become the China’s dominant producer of fruit juices.  
 The deal began with Coke’s offer in September 2008 to pay $2.4 billion for a 
majority stake in Huiyuan. This relatively high price came as a surprise to many because 
it was nearly three times Huiyuan’s share price on the day prior to Coke’s 
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announcement.232 Coke had already secured binding agreements with three shareholders 
representing 66% of Huiyuan’s total shares.233 Chairman Zhu Xinli, French food giant 
Groupe Danone, and private equity firm Warburg Pincus held a 36%, 23%, and 7% stake, 
respectively.234 Danone mentioned that the high premium was one of the main reasons it 
agreed to the deal. “The price is good. It’s three times the market price and reflects a 
price to earnings ratio of 50,” said Dannon. “We are happy now to concentrate on the 
Chinese water market.”235 This deal was said to have been the largest bid to date for 
foreign control of a Chinese firm and the second biggest deal in Coke’s own history.236 
The only process left was gaining regulatory approval from the Chinese.  
 Some expressed optimism, while others had doubts about Coke obtaining consent 
from Chinese regulators. “If Coke offers a really great amount of money, nationalism will 
yield to the money,” said Conita Hung, director of equity markets for Delta Asia 
Financial Group in Hong Kong.237 Huang Dejun, president of Beijing consulting 
company Orient Agribusiness, predicted that Beijing will allow the deal because 
Huiyuan’s total share of juice sales in China is less than 8%, meaning that the purchase 
would not likely give Coke a monopoly in the market.”238 Other deal watchers said that 
Huiyuan’s status as a private company and the beverage sector’s small role in the 
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economy are reasons to believe that the agreement could be approved.239 Unlike the steel 
or high-technology machinery industry, the beverage industry is not often viewed as a 
strategically sensitive industry.  
Nevertheless, some analysts expressed skepticism citing the AML that had taken 
effect the previous month. “Coke picked a bad time for this deal,” said Li Su, president of 
Beijing consulting firm H&J Vanguard Research, “Government regulators are likely to be 
concerned because the acquisition would be deadly for mid-range and smaller beverage 
companies.”240 The vice chairman of Roth Capital Partners, Donald Straszheim also 
doubted that the deal would be allowed noting the AML. “We do not see significant 
reasons why the authorities would allow a major acquisition by a foreign firm of a highly 
visible domestic company,” he said in a report to clients.241 A researcher at the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, a government think tank 
under MOFCOM, Mei Xinyu said that the large size of the two companies and Huiyuan’s 
high-profile domestic brand name were two main challenges that would deter 
government approval.242   
The skeptics had a more accurate outlook judging from the negative response 
toward the deal from rival domestic juice makers, local media, and public opinion. After 
the announcement of the deal, Huiyuan’s domestic competitors aggressively complained 
that the deal would give Coke a dominant share in the juice market. Zhang Qian, manager 
of China Lingbao Amusi Fruit Juice, asserted that even though the takeover would not 
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have a head-on impact on Lingbao’s business, it still posed a monopolistic threat. “We 
hope the government and the judiciary department can forestall the deal,” she said in an 
interview.243 Chang Tong, manager at China Haishen Juice Holdings, and Hou Yali from 
Beijing Shunxin Qianshou Fruit Beverage Co., Ltd. also expressed great concerns about 
what the deal would do to Chinese home-grown brands.244  
What is more, many reports covered by Chinese local media negatively depicted 
the takeover bid. “Coca-Cola drinks Huiyuan Juice,” was a common headline in the 
news.245 Yellow journalism played a role in stirring up nationalist sentiment as well. For 
instance, national tabloid Global Times published a commentary saying, “They are 
following the strategy of ‘Don’t touch mine, but I will take yours.’ If we give up our local 
brand...we will be manipulated by them.”246 Public opinion on the Internet was also not in 
favor of the sale. In an unscientific online poll by the major Chinese portal Sina.com, 
roughly 80% of the 450,000 people who took the poll objected Coke’s acquisition of 
Huiyuan.247 Clearly, many Chinese netizens were disturbed about the potential loss of a 
popular domestic brand to a foreign company.  
Amidst this resistance, MOFCOM began the antitrust review in mid-November. 
The spokesman of MOFCOM emphasized that the government would abide by the 
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principals of a market-oriented economy under the legal process.248 “[The ministry] is 
against monopoly while supporting ‘normal economic activities,’” Yao Shenhong said in 
an interview with Xinhua.249 Coke and Huiyuan issued a joint statement on the Hong 
Kong Stock exchange stating that MOFCOM’s review would continue until March 23, 
2009.250 The review would consider factors like the deal's effect on market share, market 
concentration, branding power, and consumers.251 To show its commitment to the 
mainland, Coke pledged in early March that it would invest $2 billion in China over the 
next three years.252  
However, this proved to be insufficient in winning the government’s approval of 
the deal. After six months of review, MOFCOM rejected the deal on March 18, 2009, 
saying that Coke is “very likely to take a dominating position in the domestic market if 
the acquisition went into effect.”253 The ministry also argued that consumers may have to 
accept a high price fixed by Coke and smaller juice businesses may be threatened due to 
reduced market competition. Despite MOFCOM’s denial of protectionism, many 
analysts, lawyers, and bankers thought otherwise.254 Steve Harris, coordinator of the Asia 
antitrust practice for the law firm Jones Day, remarked, “Businesses could interpret the 
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decision as a protectionist move, not sound antitrust regulation.”255 Managing partner at 
Atlanta Capital Management, William Hackney similarly noted, “[It] sends a strong 
protectionist message to the rest of the world.”256 Many prospective foreign buyers had 
hoped for a successful deal because it would signify the government’s willingness to 
allow more future foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. However, the ultimate 
failure of the Coke-Huiyuan case evidenced the formidable hurdles that foreign investors 
considering M&A deals would have to overcome in the future.  
Unlike all the other Chinese firms dealt with in the previous case studies, Huiyuan 
is not a SOE, a possible factor why the government was forced to be more sensitive of 
how the M&A transaction could have disrupted fair market competition.  The sheer size 
of the deal may been alarming for regulators. Similar to the Carlyle-Xugong case, it is 
difficult to believe that the U.S. government's blockage on CNOOC's bid in 2005 did not 
influence the decision made by MOFCOM. It could possibly have been a classic case of 
tit-for-tat, indicating the Chinese government's tendency to resort to economic 
protectionism if the U.S. does so as well. This portrays the political considerations of 
regulators in their review process. Moreover, the Coke-Huiyuan deal depicts that even 
sectors that are not strategically sensitive to national or economic security like the retail 
industry can be a difficult market to penetrate for foreign investors.  
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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned from Case Studies 
 
 Each case study offers valuable insight into the intricacies of private equity 
investments in Chinese firms. As laid out in Chapter 3, the Chinese government has 
progressively developed the regulatory environment for foreign private equity investment 
to build a more sophisticated market economy in the face of economic 
internationalization. However, the state continues to maintain a stronghold on certain 
industries. Hsueh calls this China’s “bifurcated strategy,” referring to the duality of the 
government strictly managing strategic sectors related to national security or the 
promotion of economic and technological development, while relinquishing control over 
less strategic sectors.257 However, the case studies in this thesis prove that there can be 
exceptions to this approach. As previously mentioned, traditionally, China’s strategic 
industries were in banking, defense, power, resources, telecommunications, and 
transportation.258 In the State Council’s recently published “12th Five-Year Plan for 
National Strategic Emerging Industries,” the government included industries like biology, 
environmental protection, new energy, and high-end equipment manufacturing.259 
Neither Xugong nor Huiyuan were in any of these strategic industries, but the 
government did not allow foreign private equity investments in these firms. In contrast, 
Newbridge obtained approval even though SDB was in the highly regulated and sensitive 
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banking sector. This implies that there are underlying factors that may not appear to be 
obvious on the surface.   
There are numerous variables that influence the outcome of private equity deals in 
China; therefore, it would be inaccurate to make generalizations based on these case 
studies. Nevertheless, an examination of the parallels drawn from the four case studies 
can shed light upon why exceptions to the "bifurcated strategy" exist. The two main 
parallels that will be discussed are guanxi and nationalism. 
First, the role of guanxi cannot be overlooked when doing business transactions in 
China and the case studies show that foreign private equity investment is not an 
exception. The literal translation of the ‘guanxi’ means connections or social 
relationships. Not only is guanxi embedded in China’s group-oriented society, but it also 
plays a key role for business success in China.260 The two forms of guanxi are often 
divided into "the web of personal connections, relationships, and obligations that business 
people can use to obtain resources and advantages" and "the exchange of favors or the 
purchase of resources."261 This analysis will pertain to the former type of guanxi. 
Business transactions in Western countries also heavily rely on networks, but the Chinese 
way of networking is different in the sense that connections especially with government 
officials are much more crucial to success. This is mainly because all business 
relationships in China involve some kind of encounter with the government. Foreign 
investors in China must develop good personal relationships with key government 
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officials because government assumes the roles of legislator, law enforcer, and judge.262 
Some academic studies have contended that the strategic importance of guanxi may be 
diminishing with China’s increased outward investment, market liberalization, and legal 
reforms (Guthrie, 1998; Yang, 2001; Wilson and Brennan, 2009). However, the parallels 
between the two success stories of foreign private equity investment presented in this 
thesis seem to suggest otherwise.  
The Newbridge-SDB and Blackstone-BlueStar cases show how guanxi can lead to 
a successful private equity deal even in a SOE of which the government is typically 
protective. Weijian Shan of Newbridge and Antony Leung of Blackstone were both 
remarkably skilled negotiators who had an extensive guanxi network in China. They were 
able to build such relationships because they had earned the respect of Chinese 
businessmen and government officials. In particular, their experience in the investment 
banking sector seems to have helped them build a reputation as a leading expert in the 
industry. For Shan, his prior success with turning around KFB added to his credibility, 
gaining the support of China’s top policymakers even before making the bid for SDB.263 
Leung was able to skip the bidding process altogether because he directly pitched to high-
ranking government officials who ran SOEs. The relationships he had built with the 
Chinese business and political community in Hong Kong during his time at Citi, Chase, 
and the government proved to be essential in getting a head start in the search for 
lucrative private equity deals.  
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Interestingly, Shan and Leung had quite contrasting views of China's market 
economy and corporate culture. By writing newspaper editorials and serving as an 
independent board director in a few Chinese firms, Shan has sought out to change 
China’s business culture.264 His critical perspective on China’s growth was evident in his 
Wall Street Journal article titled “The World Bank’s China Delusions.”265 Contending 
that China’s total debt-to-equity swaps and bank recapitalization dealing with NPLs 
exceeded the total pre-tax profits in China’s industrial sector since 1999, Shan attributed 
the source of China’s rapid growth in investment to lax bank lending rather than a surge 
in profits as the World Bank had reported.266 His other articles like “The Mystery of 
China’s Sinking Stocks” and “China’s Yuan Overvalued” offer similar critiques of 
China's market deficiencies.267 He asserted that bank-sponsored investment binges can be 
detrimental to the banking system in the long-run and proposed that the solution would be 
to introduce proper incentives for loan officers, implying their tendency to lend based on 
relationships rather than returns.268 As an independent board member of Baosteel, a large 
state-owned iron and steel company, Shan opposed to the firm’s plan to convert its state-
owned shares into tradable shares in 2005 saying that the scheme is both wrong and 
illegal because it would lead to an unequal treatment of different shareholders.269 
Similarly, he questioned Beijing’s decision to shuffle managers between telecom firms as 
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a board member of China Unicom and led the investigation of a corruption scandal 
dealing with irregular loans as a board member of BOC’s Hong Kong branch.270  
On the contrary, Leung was involved in a scandal himself in 2003. Briefly 
mentioned in the case study, Leung’s “Lexusgate” scandal drew in sharp criticism from 
the public. Though Leung denied that he was trying to avoid taxes saying he simply 
needed a bigger car for his new baby daughter, Hong Kong citizens and lawmakers were 
not persuaded.271 He even offered to donate $100,000 to charity, twice the amount that 
would have been due after higher registration taxes for new vehicles, but many people 
still questioned his integrity.272 Some feared that the decision of the Department of 
Justice not to prosecute Leung would set a precedent making it more difficult to punish 
public officers for misconduct.273 His misbehavior was also overlooked by government 
officials in China because more than a year after disappearing from public view, he was 
seen in a documentary on China Central Television playing with his wife and daughter.274 
Shortly afterwards, he talked at a financial services forum to which he was invited by the 
Beijing municipal government.275 His tight personal relationships with government 
officials helped him to rise back even after his scandal. Leung’s behavior contrasts with 
Shan, who often denounced unethical conducts in China’s business world. 
Nevertheless, both figures were able to gain the necessary support from Chinese 
regulators to complete the private equity deal. This suggests that a dealmaker’s expertise 
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in the relevant field may be more significant than his or her views of China’s market 
economy or business ethics. Newbridge had past investment experience in the banking 
sector and Blackstone had prior involvement in the chemical industry. Shan was able to 
lead Newbridge to a successful agreement with a state-owned bank through his 
connections just like Leung used his network to gain regulatory support. Looking at 
Shan, establishing guanxi in China does not necessarily mean condoning to unethical 
business behavior in China and flattering government officials if one has built a credible 
reputation with deep industry knowledge.  
That is not to say that Carlyle and Coke lacked a wide guanxi network unlike 
Newbridge and Blackstone. Carlyle was one of the pioneers of private equity in China, 
launching its first Asia buyout in 1999. XD Yang, the dealmaker who led Carlyle’s 
investments in China, was a Chinese-born, Western-educated skilled businessman with 
previous investment banking experience just like Shan and Leung. His nine years at 
Goldman Sachs, where he was a managing director and co-head of private equity 
investment in Asia, would have helped him build an extensive business network in China. 
Coke also has a long history of doing business in China, re-entering the country in 1979. 
The company built solid relations with the government especially after sponsoring the 
2008 Beijing Olympics. However, both firms still failed to gain regulatory approval of 
their buyout agreements.  
One possible explanation for their failures is the nationalistic opposition toward 
the deals. The upsurge of Chinese nationalism occurred in the aftermath of the 1989 
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Tiananmen Square massacre, a dreadful setback to political democratization in China.276 
Nationalism in China is often linked to anti-Western sentiment, which was initially 
encouraged by government propaganda in the 1990s.277 Starting from the late 1990s, the 
U.S. trade deficit with China rose tremendously and there was increasing pressure on 
China to open its market to Western goods, bringing about economic nationalism, the 
“ideas and activities aimed at defending and promoting national economic interests to 
build up strong nation through economic means.”278 During a similar time period, cyber 
nationalism began to emerge with the rise of the Internet in China. A non-government 
sponsored ideology and movement that has originated, existed, and developed in China’s 
online sphere over the past two decades, cyber nationalism can play a significant role in 
China’s policy making process.279 In the past, CCP leaders were forced to change the 
course of their foreign policy to satisfy heightening public pressure expressed online.280  
A combination of these two types of nationalism was evident in the Carlyle-
Xugong and Coke-Huiyuan case. In both instances, the public voiced great concern 
online about a Chinese firm being sold at a cheap price to a “greedy” foreign investor. 
The situation got serious once it started receiving media attention through newspapers 
and the television. In Xugong’s case, the nationalist sentiment was instigated by the CEO 
of Sany Corporation, Xugong’s main competitor. Xiang Wenbo used Internet blogging, a 
tool that is widely accessible to the public, to stir up hostility against Carlyle. In 
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Huiyuan’s case, there was no single figure who sparked the uproar of domestic 
opposition toward Coke’s acquisition, but it rather originated from the people’s 
attachment to the national brand, also known as consumer ethnocentricism, the fear of 
economically harming his or her beloved country by buying foreign products, the 
morality of buying imported products, and a personal prejudice against imports.281 It is 
more relevant to Huiyuan than Xugong because Huiyuan sells consumer products, which 
are widely obtainable by the public.  
Furthermore, industry competitors seem to have used the nationalist wave and 
media spotlight to their advantage in both cases, making it even more difficult for the 
foreign firm to obtain approval from Chinese regulators.  The unprecedented meeting 
among Xugong’s shareholders, competitors, suppliers, and customers with MOFCOM 
and CSRC to discuss the Carlyle deal indicates the Chinese government’s sensitivity 
toward the opinion of domestic players in the market. Although not as large in scale, 
competitors of Huiyuan also had meetings with MOFCOM to voice their opposition.282 
Once an issue at hand grows out of proportion, the Chinese government is forced to take 
the domestic opinion into serious consideration in their decision-making process. This is 
because the government gains legitimacy by serving the people; and in order to serve the 
people, the government must maintain political and social stability.283 The vitality of 
“stability” dates all the way back to the Tiananmen Square incident. After the crackdown, 
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Deng famously stated, “Stability above everything else (稳定压倒一切).” Evidently, this 
crucial principle remains relevant to the Chinese government until this day.284 
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Chapter 7: The Future of China's Private Equity Market 
 
There is a plethora of opportunities that China's private equity market has to offer 
to foreign investors. At the same time, however, the parallels from the case studies 
illustrate the complexity and unpredictability of the whole private equity investment 
process in China. In each step of the way, foreign investors are met with formidable 
challenges, indicating that the future of China's private equity market may not be so 
bright as it seems.   
The selection stage is getting increasingly difficult for foreign private equity 
investors because good deals are getting scarcer and valuations are becoming exceedingly 
high.285 With too many funds chasing after too few deals, target firms are becoming 
overvalued, which increases the investment risk in Chinese firms. Moreover, the due 
diligence process, in particular, presents a tough task for investors. In a recent TED Talk, 
Yong Kwek Ping asserted that the conventional checklist of due diligence is not enough 
in China. Foreign investors must go beyond and examine things like the family 
background of the founder or the validity of the firm's business certificates.286 
Investigating whether the founder of a firm has a mistress or suffers from gambling 
addiction in the due diligence process is unthinkable in the West. This demonstrates the 
anomalies and challenges that may continue to persist in China's private equity industry.  
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The structuring phase, as seen in the case studies, can lead to conflicts with the 
existing board and uncertainties concerning regulatory approval. The Chinese 
government not only takes political and economic factors into consideration, but is also 
substantially influenced by cultural factors like guanxi and nationalism. In the 
management stage, foreign private equity investors are frequently confronted with 
resistance to change and a failure to honor contracts by the target company.287 Many 
Chinese companies believe that the terms and conditions of a contract are still negotiable 
even after its execution, so there are many instances when penalties are ignored.288 This is 
strikingly problematic for portfolio management. The lack of sophistication in China's 
judicial system is another obstacles that foreign investors will have to overcome.  
The biggest challenge of all may be the barriers against exit mechanisms for 
private equity investments in China.  There are rising concerns about foreign investment 
being trapped in China's private equity deals.289 According to a 2013 research report 
published by China First Capital, over $100 billion in private equity and venture capital 
investments is currently locked into deals with no easy exit route.290 A 2014 Financial 
Times commentary offered similar research results saying that the number and value of 
exits have dropped for the third consecutive year. Private equity fundraising in both RMB 
and foreign currency also saw a sharp plunge in 2013 despite investors saying that China 
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is the most attractive market in Asia.291 Based on these trends, foreign private equity 
firms should be more cautious when investing in Chinese firms in the future.  
Nevertheless, many analysts and businessmen have insisted that the opportunities 
outweigh the risks and ambiguities of China's private equity market. In a Harvard 
Business Review article, the chairman of Booz & Company, Edward Tse was noted for 
saying, "Yes, it's a tough market. And yes, your competitors may have gotten there first. 
But the biggest mistake would be choosing not to invest in China." With a sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the context in which China's complicated and 
competitive market is situated, investors can take full advantage of China's growth 
potential.292 Similarly, to reiterate the words of Blackstone's CEO from Chapter 4, "China 
is a required course, not an elective, for any sensible global financial institution."  
There is no set formula for a successful private equity investment in China. The 
persistence of China’s legal, political, and economic risks may exacerbate the volatility of 
its private equity market. Though the possibility of extraordinary high returns in China 
paints a rosy picture for foreign private equity investors, they should also keep this Latin 
phrase in mind: caveat emptor.  May the buyer beware.  
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